Defining Crisis News Events by Olsson, Eva-Karin
87
Nordicom Review 31 (2010) 1, pp. 87-101
Defining Crisis News Events
Eva-Karin Olsson
Abstract
Research on news organizations’ handling of ‘what-a-story’s proposes that journalists find 
routines for handling these events based on their previous experiences of similar situations. 
Still, conceptual discussions on how to define extraordinary events or ’what-a-story’s have 
thus far attracted limited interest. In response, the present article proposes a definition of 
‘what-a-story’s in order to provide an understanding of what events become a part of news 
organizations’ historical case banks. Accordingly, the aim of the article is to present a defi-
nition of crisis news events from an organizational perspective, which can help distinguish 
critical news events of importance to news organizations’ learning and preparedness. The 
article argues that crisis news are to be understood as surprise events that challenge key 
organizational values and demand a swift response. Based on interviews with Swedish 
broadcasting media managers, the article illustrates how the September 11th terror attacks 
can be defined as a crisis event. 
Keywords: crisis, journalistic practices, media, attacks, September 11th, organizational 
learning, decision-making 
Introduction
When two fully-fueled Boeing 767s crashed into New York City’s World Trade Center 
twin towers, there was little doubt that the world was witnessing one of the most spec-
tacular terrorist attacks in modern times. Interviews with media managers from the main 
Swedish broadcasting organizations revealed that, despite the unique and astonishing 
character of 9/11, the terrorist attacks were placed in a certain category of previous ex-
traordinary news events.1 The categorization was important for Swedish media managers 
in so far as they recognized the event as a very special kind of news, with the potential 
to challenge everyday routines and practices. In doing so, the 9/11 attacks were placed 
in a category with a few, mainly Swedish, news events, such as the assassination of 
Prime Minister Olof Palme in 1986, the sinking of the passenger ferry MS Estonia in 
1994, and the Gothenburg disco fire in 1998 where 63 young people died – events that 
at a cursory glance seem quite different from each other. The question tackled here is: 
What made the events similar to one another in the minds of Swedish media managers, 
e.g., which characteristics define really big news events and what made them fall into 
a special category of news events? 
How the terrorist attacks were reported on has been studied by several scholars, both 
in a Swedish (see, e.g., Nord and Strömbäck 2006; 2003; 2002, Nordström 2002) as 
well as in an international context (see, e.g., Aufderheide 2002; Coleman and Wu 2006; 
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Zelizer and Allan 2002; Mogensen 2008; Bouvier 2005; Hoskin 2004; Reynolds and 
Barnett 2003). The role of history in journalism reporting has further been addressed 
in relation to how journalists cover news events (Edy 1999; Houchin Winfield et al. 
2002; Lang and Lang 1989; Robinson 2006; Edy and Daradanova 2006; Ryan 2004). 
Thus, what have not been examined thus far are the mechanisms behind media manag-
ers’ organizational decision-making during large-scale unexpected news events – for 
example, how do media managers decide upon ‘disaster marathons’ (Liebes 1992, 1998; 
Liebes and Blondheim 2002) and how do they restructure their organizations to meet 
the challenges posed by such a decision? The present article argues that in order to 
answer questions concerning how media managers draw upon previous experiences in 
their decision-making, and to build up more systematic knowledge about organizational 
preparedness in the media, there is a need for clear definitions that distinguish this very 
special category of news from everyday reporting. In order to do so, a crisis definition is 
proposed based on media managers’ perception of the event in terms of surprise, threat 
to organizational values, and limited decision time (Seeger, Sellnow and Umer 1998). 
Lack of Concepts and Definitions 
In the literature on ‘extraordinary events’, there are several different concepts in cir-
culation, such as ‘what-a-story’ (Tuchman 1973; Berkowitz 1992)2, ‘holy-shit story’ 
(Romano 1986), ‘gee-whiz story’ (Gans 2004: 156-157), ‘crisis’ (Nohrstedt 2000), and 
‘disaster’ (Scanlon 2007; Quarentelli 2005). The pluralism of concepts is a problem in 
that it hampers efforts to build up more systematic knowledge about how news media 
cope with these non-routine events. Gunilla Jarlbro (2004: 18), who made an overview 
of media research on disasters, crises and extraordinary events, argues that the variety 
of concepts and definitions flourishing in the field makes it exceedingly difficult to 
interpret and compare research results. The difficulties in building up more systematic 
knowledge in the field of media and crises, due to the multitude of theoretical frame-
works and concepts, have further been emphasized by Norhstedt (2000). According to 
disaster researcher Joseph Scanlon (2007), research on media and crises/disasters can 
be said to be divided into two main strands: sociological disaster research on media 
and research on media and journalism dealing with news work practices. According to 
Scanlon, cross-referencing between the two traditions is rare, and they generally seem 
to be unaware of one another’s existence (p. 75). 
I would argue that the two research traditions described above differ in how they 
define their object of study in so far as researchers focused on news work apply what 
I refer to as an inside-the-media perspective, and researchers focused on disasters and 
crises apply an outside-the-media perspective. This is the case because the reasons for 
examining news media in connection with extraordinary events differ. The literature 
on disasters/crises deals with how the media report on situations characterized as crisis 
events from a socio-political perspective (see, e.g., Nohrstedt 2000; Quarantelli 1996; 
1989; 2002). However, these events might well be routine reporting for the media.3 
The inside-the-media perspective, on the other hand, makes the distinction based on 
whether the event is a routine or non-routine event from the perspective of the jour-
nalists involved in news production. According to previous research on news work, 
the notion of categorization explains how journalists are able to cope with what from 
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an outside perspective appears as the unpredictability and uncertainty of news events 
(Bantz 1990; Molotch and Lester 1974; Tuchman 1973; Schlesinger 1977; Berkowitz 
1992). The concept of ‘what-a-story’ is then understood as a deviant concept, which 
differs from routine news owing to its surprise nature. 
As a way of overcoming the divide in definitions between the two research tradi-
tions, I apply a definition taken from an organizational crisis management perspective 
in order to incorporate both the journalists perception of an event (the inside-the-media 
perspective) with the societal demands on media reporting during crises (the outside-the-
media perspective). According to Boin et al. (2005), it is vital to take into account the 
decision-makers’ own perceptions of the above criteria when trying to understand what 
made a certain event a crisis for the organization in question. Accordingly, in the present 
article, I argue that media managers’ perceptions of an event in terms of surprise, threat 
to organizational values, and limited decision time provide one fruitful way of defining 
crisis events for media organizations (Seeger, Sellnow and Umer 1998). The definition 
combines the inside perspective with the outside perspective by emphasizing that the 
societal magnitude of the event is what makes it a challenge for news organizations and 
what prompts speedy crisis coverage. On the other hand, the notion of surprise is closely 
related to previous research on news work that emphasizes journalists’ interpretations 
of news events. Further, the notion of journalists’ categorization of events into certain 
categories is closely connected to the role of previous experiences of similar events, 
which will be briefly discussed in the next section. 
The Role of History in News Organizations’ Response to Big News Events 
The importance of correctly categorizing news events is stressed by Berkowitz (1992), 
who argues that typifying news events presents one of the biggest challenges a news 
organization can confront, as that classification determines what resources and work-
ing processes the coverage will demand. According to Tuchman (1973) and Berkowitz 
(1992), previous experiences play an important role in journalists’ responses to ‘what-
a-story’s. In this vein, one of the findings from Tuchman’s (1973) study on newsroom 
practices was that “rules governing the coverage of ‘what-a-story’ were invoked by 
citing another ‘what-a-story’” (p. 128). Similarly, Nord and Strömbäck (2006) argue 
that the possibility for news organizations to do a good job increases if the organiza-
tions have previously confronted similar news events. This is the case because, “[i]f an 
event can be anticipated, news departments can change their priorities, time schedules 
and working procedures in order to improve coverage of the forthcoming event” (ibid.: 
88-89). Notwithstanding, the authors call attention to the fact that there is a lack of em-
pirical research concerning how news organizations manage truly unexpected events. 
Likewise, and they also stress that ‘normal’ crises rarely expose news organizations to 
severe constraints and that such knowledge can only be gained in connection with big 
news events such as 9/11 (Nord and Strömbäck 2002: 167). 
Zelizer (1993a; 1993b) applies a somewhat different perspective regarding the role 
of history in connection to the development of journalistic norms, practices, and values. 
From her point of view journalists are an interpretative community, which is in contrast 
to the idea of solely understanding journalism as a ‘profession’. One central feature of 
interpretative communities is the telling of common stories centered on certain key news 
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events, in which experiences and stories related to journalistic attitudes and work routines 
are developed. These stories eventually become common journalistic norms whereby 
“journalists become involved in an ongoing process by which they create a repertoire of 
past events that is used as standards for judging contemporary action. By relying on shared 
interpretations, they build authority for practices not emphasized by traditional views of 
journalism” (Zelizer 1993a: 224). Further, journalists are depicted as being caught in ‘dou-
ble time’, oscillating between the ‘local mode of interpretation’, which consists of lessons 
learned from a particular news work context, and the ‘durational mode of interpretation’, 
in which particular incidents become part of a broader history of journalism. 
As can be seen from the discussion above, both Zelizer and Tuchman acknowledge 
the role of history and previous experience in connection with big news events. Yet they 
differ in their understanding of journalistic routines; Tuchman’s notion of typification 
is more static then Zelizer’s notion of journalists as ‘interpretative communities’, as 
the latter is more open to change and the development of routines in connection with 
big news events. In contrast to previous research that focuses on journalistic practices 
for reporting news events, the present article contributes to knowledge in the field by 
examining how top media managers, with responsibility for overarching organizational 
responses, categorize crisis events. Here I argue, in a manner somewhat similar to 
Zelizer’s (1993a; 1993b), that crisis events form a special category of events that have 
the potential to challenge existing routines. As already mentioned, Zelizer understands 
the change of practices as a learning process, alternating between the two modes of 
interpretation described above. The following section is a short summary of how Swed-
ish media managers linked the September 11th events to previous similar crisis events, 
which consequently had significant implications for change and development of their 
news practices. Accordingly, this can be read as an illustration of a learning process. 
Crisis Events and Their Importance for Organizational Learning 
This section briefly illustrates how the Swedish media managers referred to previous 
crisis events and the role of these events in organizational learning. Frequent referencing, 
and the similarities within and across the managerial groups in terms of which events 
they refer to, strengthens the notion of crisis events as an important category of events 
for development of news organizational practices. 
Starting with the managerial group at Swedish Radio (SR), the 9/11 terror attacks 
were placed in the same category of previous events as the murder of Olof Palme, the 
sinking of the passenger ferry MS Estonia, the Gothenburg disco fire, and the Gothen-
burg riots. According to the Director of Programs “National” at SR, the events were 
similar in that they all placed high demands on the organization and, in the end, risked 
jeopardizing organizational legitimacy. “You realize that it is important to reflect upon 
these kinds of events in the correct way. These events are also the types of events that 
demand the most from us professionally. It is vital that we do our best”. According to 
the Director of Programs “Local/National”, SR has no set contingency plans for cop-
ing with crisis events. However, previous experiences have played an important role in 
developing mental preparedness and in modifying practices. Thus, he stresses that SR’s 
response to the terror attacks was an exceptionally successful example compared to the 
management of previous similar events: “Unfortunately, we have had the opportunity to 
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practice dealing with these kinds of events at frequent intervals – everything from the 
Palme murder to the sinking of the Estonia. […] Even though we have not managed all 
of them well, we have tried to evaluate and learn from all of these events” (Director of 
Programs “Local/National” at SR). 
In a similar manner the managerial group at Swedish Television (SVT) also referred 
to previous events in terms of their impact on organizational preparedness. Similar to 
SR, references were made to events such as the sinking of the Estonia, the Palme murder 
and the Gothenburg riots. Further, in relation to the amount of coverage broadcasted, 
events such as the death of Princess Diana4 and the Stockholm murders at Stureplan 
were also mentioned. Just as the managerial group at SR did, the managers interviewed 
at SVT mentioned the importance of these big news events to organizational learning. 
“All of these big news events have been followed up internally by enormous amounts 
of discussions and evaluations. We did this after Estonia, and in connection with the 
murder of Olof Palme […] the riots in Gothenburg and the murders at Stureplan […] 
and we revised our internal procedures every time” (the Head of News, SVT). Even if 
certain events contain similar features, the Head of News nonetheless stressed the fact 
that one defining characteristic is that such events are never identical. This means that 
every crisis news event tends to make its own specific contribution to the development 
of the overall organizational preparedness of news enterprises. For example, the main 
lesson learned from the shootings at Stureplan in 19945 was that the newcomer TV46 
was much better than SVT at reporting news quickly, which made SVT work harder on 
developing its capacity for quick coverage.
In relation to Zelizer’s notion of durational mode of interpretation, the Head of News 
at SVT emphasized that some news events affect the entire media sector’s perception 
of media preparedness. The murder of Olof Palme in 1986 is a good example of such a 
wake-up call in relation to quick coverage. “The Palme murder played a very important 
role in moving us onto a new level of news preparedness in Sweden. It was an awak-
ening, and it posed new demands on us concerning how fast we can supply the news. 
These demands were quite low before.” According to the Head of News, the terrorist 
attack on 11 September 2001 can be compared to the murder of Olof Palme in that both 
were very special types of events. 
You could follow the event [9/11] completely. There was something special about 
it that shook us up. This contributed to the fact that what happened on September 
11th is not really applicable to big news events in general, I think. Even though 
there are enormous amounts of lessons to be learned from this event. It is similar 
in many ways to the Palme murder, since it also aroused all of the news desks and 
made them reassess their level of preparedness. I mean, at the newspapers they 
just turned off the lights and went home […] but Swedish Radio had problems 
with their switchboard and… There are a lot of these kinds of events that have an 
effect on how news organizations are designed (Head of News SVT/Anna Lindh 
interview). 
Also the CEO at TV4 refers to the murder of Olof Palme as a vital moment for the overall 
preparedness of Swedish news organizations. “The Palme murder was a disaster from a 
media perspective, where people at the [Swedish] radio and [Swedish] TV simply went 
back to bed again. […] That was a real wake-up call for the big city media.” 
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In relation to their own organization, the managers at TV4 stressed the significance 
of big news events for organizational preparedness. According to the Director of Cur-
rent Affairs, every big news event evokes new practices. “Every big news event is 
different, but every time routines get strengthened, and accordingly we get better and 
better at making sure that we have alarm lists and procedures”. In relation to learning, 
he emphasized the importance of not taking for granted that the last way of covering an 
event can automatically be applied to the next situation. Therefore, it is important not 
to stick to a fixed routine but rather to have “a high preparedness consisting of people 
who can cope with these kinds of situations, which look different every time. The only 
thing you can do is to make sure you can have good deliberation procedures so you can 
make good decisions”. According to the Director of Programs at TV4, there are certain 
key events that have played a vital role in building up TV4’s decision-making procedures 
in connection with big news events. These were summed up as follows: “there is always 
this discussion on what constitutes a big news event and it cannot be defined exactly 
with millimeter precision, but in connection with the sinking of the Estonia, the terror 
attacks, and other events such as these, like the Gothenburg fire”.7 
In more general terms, the CEO of TV4 emphasized that big news events have certain 
characteristics that make them special events for the news media – even though they 
are difficult to describe with precision. “You follow an impulse, a reflex; you receive 
training on how to act when it comes to a crisis. I must say that it is quite special.” He 
pointed out that it might be hard to learn specific lessons from these occurrences; rather 
one learns the special character of the news work required by these events: 
When it really goes off, everyone is there and there is a very special kind of 
teamwork. I still remember the night when Palme was murdered, and the way we 
worked back then, and the change of government in 1976. […] It works in a dif-
ferent way; you tear down the walls and go with the flow. And it works in a way 
that is hard to describe if one has not been there. And it works, because everyone 
becomes a soldier and wants to pitch in. 
To summarize, the managerial groups in all three media organizations primarily referred 
to the same historical events when linking the terrorist attacks to previous events. Fur-
ther, the discussion above points to the somewhat paradoxical nature of these types of 
events. It is obvious that big news events form a special category of events, yet at the 
same time, one of the defining characteristics is that they differ from one another. In 
the following section, I will illustrate how these two, at first glance contradictory char-
acteristics, become less contradictory when we look at big news events from a crisis 
perspective. The crisis definition will be applied to media managers’ own accounts of 
how they perceived the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. 
Surprise, Challenge to Organizational Values,  
and Short Decision Time – Defining Crisis Events 
Surprise
The perception of surprise and uncertainty is salient when speaking to Swedish media 
managers about their experience of the September 11th terrorist attacks. They all referred 
to how extraordinary and unexpected the event was. For example, the Director of Plan-
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ning at SVT stated, “It became almost a bit supernatural in a way. I mean when the two 
towers collapsed; it was such an unlikely and illogical event. It almost became like one 
of those computer games”. A strikingly similar opinion was expressed by the Head of 
News at SVT, “Of all the big events that we have handled, this one was beyond every-
thing else. The event was so shocking that the normal standards were no longer valid.” 
Still, the Head of News at SVT compared the terrorist attacks to the murder of Swedish 
Prime Minister Olof Palme in 1986, due to their surprise effects. 
I think that both the Palme murder and the terror attacks of September 11th were 
events that no one could foresee; where reality in some way surpassed fiction. 
Not even a group of journalists, having a brainstorm session, could have specu-
lated about such an event. You cannot make up these sorts of things. Two planes 
crashing into a tower; it is simply too much. I remember escorting Prime Minister 
Göran Persson to an interview that day and how he was referring to some kind of 
a movie with the same theme. 
Further, the Head of News compared the terrorist attacks to the murder of Foreign Min-
ister Anna Lindh two years later, which according to him was not perceived as being 
an equally big news event even though it still demanded a special kind of coverage. Yet 
the murder of Anna Lindh did not evoke the same amount of surprise as the assignation 
of Olof Palme in 1986, despite the fact that there were quite similar events. “We have 
already had a Prime Minister who was murdered. […] It has happened before. It is 
already discounted in the minds of the journalists; I mean the news event as such, and 
how to work with it. September 11th did not have that character, it deviated so much from 
anything we had seen before.” The Head of News at TV4 made the same comparison: 
“It [the terrorist attack] was a news event, never seen before, that was the big difference 
[between the two]”. Besides the murder of Olof Palme, the Head of News at SVT also 
compared the terrorist attacks to the sinking of the passenger ferry Estonia in terms of 
the surprise effect: 
The surprise effect had many similarities to Estonia, when no one understood the 
magnitude of the event. I remember when the alarm came […] I thought it was 
some sort of ship that was empty when it happened. It was impossible to imagine 
900 passengers onboard. It did not emerge from the information we had, and it 
was hard to imagine such a thing. The information available said that a ship had 
sunk and that some life vests had been seen. At least, it made me think that it was 
an accident with a couple of dead people. Then it grew like an avalanche… 
According to the Head of News, what makes these kinds of events paradoxically similar 
to one another – the surprise effect – is also the thing that makes them unique. The Head 
of Current Affairs at TV4 said that one of the essential characteristics of these events is 
the fact that none of them are equivalent to another. “Even if it actually happens to be 
an exactly identical event, our perception of that event would be totally different when 
it repeats itself, which means it has to be handled in a different way. It is impossible to 
say that this is the second time I experience this for the first time”. The uniqueness of 
these events is also the reason why it is difficult to prepare for them. “All of them have 
elements of previous news events. But at the same time, what is characteristic of really 
big news events is that they are never the same, and that is why they always lead to the 
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remaking of contingency plans”. After every big news event, new elements emerge that 
need to be fixed, meaning that yet another part of the enterprise’s organizational prepar-
edness has to be reworked (this will be elaborated on in the following section). 
Based on the above discussion, it is evident that surprise is an important aspect of 
extraordinary events. Even if the event is new, managers recognize the surprise factor 
witnessed in previous events. It is both the newness and the historical references that 
cause managers to recognize these events as a special category. 
Challenge to Organizational Values 
This section illustrates how these kinds of highly significant events present an op-
portunity for success or failure for the organizations. This is also closely connected to 
organizational legitimacy, as these are the moments when news organizations’ actions 
are under close scrutiny by the public, media critics, and other news organizations. 
According to the interviews, it is clear that crises entail both risks and opportunities, 
since these really put news organizations to the test. The interviews also revealed the im-
portance of not only internal but also external assessment of organizations’ performance 
in connection with a crisis news event. For example, the general perception within the 
SR managerial group was that the organization performed well during the 9/11 terrorist 
attacks. Interestingly enough, this opinion was not only based on internal assessments, 
but primarily on evaluations from external media critics, as expressed by one member 
of the managerial group:
The first thing is the subjective perception, even though that is quite difficult 
[…]; what are we missing out on, and what can we do better? That is a sort of 
continuous evaluation. But that is subjective. It is not until some days later when 
external critics start making their own evaluations that you know whether your 
subjective assessment was right or wrong. [After 9/11] we received good reviews 
from both radio and media critics quite quickly. 
The quote illustrates the weight external critique carried, and that personal subjective 
perception of the organization’s performance is subordinated. It also reinforces the 
notion that successful handling of these kinds of events is essential to the legitimacy 
of news organizations. Given that news organizations regard crisis news events as the 
ultimate test, a failure is devastating for an organization’s self-image and self-confidence, 
as expressed by the Head of the program Ekot at SR. 
That a news desk is confronted by a challenge like this and is able to concentrate 
all its resources on doing this kind of very well-defined work makes everyone 
realize that this is the reason we exist. To have the opportunity to do this and to 
get the acknowledgement when we have succeeded – that is very positive, and a 
news desk can live on that for a long time. On the other hand, a news desk that 
fails will have a hard time recovering. That happened for example to SVT, because 
they were quite unsuccessful. They made a lot of mistakes and have been having 
a hard time since then. 
However, the managerial group at SVT did not perceive its coverage of the event as a 
major failure on the night of 9/11, as was the case with SR as well, but the prevailing 
judgment came from external media critics. The managerial group at SVT felt misjudged 
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by its critics, particularly because the criticism was solely focused on the first evening 
and on the fact that SVT did not tear apart their pre-planned schedule (compared to SR 
and TV4). 
The critics cared about the first day, not endurance or continuity or anything like 
that, just the very first day of coverage. And we lost that fight. TV4 came off as 
more coherent, and they were, unfairly, perceived as being faster when they in 
reality were half an hour later. We learned a lot from that. 
That SVT in hindsight considered their reporting on the terrorist attacks a failure is 
confirmed by talking to the media managers at SVT. The Head of News described the 
terrorist attacks as an event that had a profound impact on the organization’s handling 
of other big news events. According to one member of the managerial group, “We have 
had great use of this when constructing contingency plans on how to act in connection 
with unexpected events […] Our experiences of September 11th have been carved in our 
heads and we will always remember September 11th”. The event became an important 
starting signal to restructure in order to be able to better cope with extraordinary news 
events. According to the Head of News at SVT, the terrorist attacks introduced a new 
way of thinking when it comes to continuous broadcasting. 
One example of the importance of crises to news organizations is the weight the 
managers give to scheduling decisions in connection with these kinds of events. Ac-
cording to the Director of Planning at SVT, news events like September 11th confront 
organizations with one of the toughest kinds of decisions – to assess the impact of the 
event and to match the audience’s perceptions of the event with the coverage. 
The worst kind of stress for the planning department is how to assess the situa-
tion. […] These kinds of situations are the most stressful because that is when 
the organization is put to the test – when trying to understand and to estimate the 
power or the importance of the event in connection with the audience assessment 
of what is reasonable coverage. 
One reason for the stress is that there are no real guidelines; instead decisions have to 
be made based on intuition and previous experience. 
It is the radar scanner: how big is this […] how profound are the changes required? 
The author Astrid Lindgren dies, ok, how much should we do in connection with 
that; the two World Trade Center towers fall, how much will we do based on that? 
It has to do with the feeling of how radically we have to change our pre-planned 
schedule. And in that context, it is obvious that the terror attacks and the sinking 
of the passenger ferry Estonia are in some way a similar experience. It is obvious 
that it does not matter what was actually scheduled, to be broadcasted even if it 
would have been the Eurovision song contest. . . 
The managerial group at SVT concluded in hindsight that the biggest failure during the 
terrorist attacks was the fact that SVT did not make enough changes in its format and 
broadcasted the news on one channel. 
Members of the managerial group at TV4 also spoke of the stress involved in de-
ciding how to cover the event. The Director of Programs at TV4 described a feeling 
of enormous uncertainty as the situation developed, and recounted a gnawing anxiety 
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over whether the managerial group discussion was flawed. “There was a growing feel-
ing while watching these pictures [on CNN] of, ‘What is this? Is it the start of a war?’ 
It seems to be something gigantic happening out there, and it does not look good. We 
need to do more”. The feeling was that it simply would not be enough to handle the 
event by adding a few extra newscasts, and there was a growing sense of uneasiness 
that more had to be done: 
Since the TVs were on in that room, the feeling of watching CNN’s pictures and 
our own broadcast, showing some nonsensical afternoon TV series, became pretty 
absurd in the end. But the whole discussion changed immediately when the towers 
fell. This is not enough anymore. It just won’t hold. 
It thus did not become clear that the whole schedule needed to be changed until the two 
towers had collapsed. 
Besides avoiding public criticism, decisions concerning how to handle these kinds 
of events are essential to attracting viewers. SVT’s self confidence was shaken by the 
fact that TV4, for the first time, received very high viewership figures during a crisis. 
The Director of News and Current Affairs at SVT explained that the terror attacks broke 
the normal viewership pattern during big news events. “Even though we were still the 
biggest, TV4 suddenly became unusually popular. Normally the audience by tradition 
turns to SVT during big news events, because it feels more reliable”. This view was 
reinforced by the Head of News at SVT. “The normal condition during big crisis event 
the audience turns to SVT, because they seek some sort of credibility and they feel they 
can find it here. But this news event was of such an enormous scale that no one initially 
cared about the sender. There was such an immense interest in following this […], which 
meant that all senders in principle had an equally large audience.” While SVT expressed 
disappointment with their viewership rates, TV4 was very content with the situation. 
According to the Director of Broadcasting at TV4, it has been the case from the start of 
TV4 that SVT is the organization with the most creditability during crisis events, and 
following the 9/11 attacks, he and his channel felt proud about changing that pattern. 
The only thing I felt proud about in a situation like this was that people were 
watching TV4 instead of SVT – during a type of occasion when people tradition-
ally turn to SVT. That people chose TV4 was a confirmation that we could be 
taken seriously in a crisis situation. We knew that many perceived us as being 
fast and therefore always checked with us, but the moment it was time for the big 
report – SVT got the opportunity. It is like the fact that the Prime Minister always 
goes to SVT first after an election and only after that to TV4. 
From the discussion above, it seems clear that crisis events have important implications 
for essential organizational values such as viewing figures and self-confidence – and 
ultimately for organizational legitimacy. 
Short Decision-making Time 
Broadcasting the news as quickly as possible lies at the core of news organizations and 
is a large part of what defines news work. Not surprisingly, the respondents in all three 
organizations mentioned the urgency of making decisions on how to broadcast events 
and of broadcasting them quickly. In analyzing the interviews, it is clear that even though 
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stress and time constraints are everyday phenomena in news organizations, the terrorist 
attacks of September 11th were still extraordinary in terms of these aspects. For all three 
of the organizations, the ability to start broadcasting on the event as soon as possible 
was the main objective of the activities undertaken. The Head of Ekot at SR for exam-
ple stressed the fact that the most important thing he did on the day in question was to 
call on the Directors of Programs to make the overarching scheduling decisions. “The 
eight hour broadcast was decided within 10 minutes. Every second counts in situations 
like this, and it is extremely difficult”. For all three managerial groups, the limited time 
available called for speedy decision-making concerning which format to use in order 
to cover the event. The first meeting with the TV4 managerial group on how to respond 
to the event was described by the Director of Broadcasting at TV4 as “stressful, and 
there was no time for long deliberations.Rather it was like, ’Let’s do it like this’.” The 
Head of Broadcasting at TV4 described the amount of tension at the first meeting, after 
finding out about the events, as follows:
At the first meeting everyone was in a state of chock. What do we do,? What has 
happened and how can anything like this even happen in the first place? It was 
obvious that we were all enormously affected, and the time to discuss and analyze 
was limited. The focus was rather on making very fast decisions – deciding what 
to do and then running off and doing it. 
According to the Director of Programs at TV4, stress is particularly troublesome for 
strategic crisis decision-making (such as making overarching program scheduling deci-
sions), as these kinds of decisions require time for reflection and discussion. 
The most problematic thing when something like this happens is to calm down 
the group. ‘Stress creates situations where people get caught up in tunnel vision 
thinking and start acting on their own.’ Let’s do it like this, I demand it..’ But 
it was actually quite calm and sensible. I remember a few times when someone 
opened the door to enter the room, and I screamed, ‘Go away! I need to work in 
peace!’ It is important to create an environment where one can make decisions 
in a calm, sensible and logical manne; ‘we need to talk about this for five more 
minutes in order to turn over a few more stones because you will gain from that 
in the long run’. 
He stated that one of the most difficult things in a situation where everyone is really 
stressed is to take the time to think through decisions, which implies that news organiza-
tion’ decision-making risks being affected by time shortages. 
This section illustrates the importance of making swift decisions in order to be able 
to start reporting on the news. Because crisis events require another format compared to 
everyday reporting, organizations need to be able to make decisions on how to reorgan-
ize and reschedule within a limited time frame. 
Concluding Discussion 
As stated at the beginning of the article, if we want to understand news organizations’ 
actions and their ability to cope with extraordinary events, a clear definition of such 
events is necessary. In describing and explaining the mechanisms that distinguish the 
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management of extraordinary events from everyday reporting, it is essential to consider 
the insider perspective and look at how events are perceived by the media managers 
and journalists themselves. Based on an abductive approach, a definition was proposed 
that takes into consideration the conditions of surprise, the challenges to organizational 
values, and the short time frames for decision-making. The criteria match the way the 
managers themselves understand such situations; that is, that certain types of crisis news 
clearly stand out from everyday reporting. 
The definition further stresses the link between the inside-the-media perspective and 
the outside-the-media perspective, where organizations risk losing legitimacy if their 
actions do not correspond to what is seen as appropriate organizational behavior based 
on the general social norms and values (Seeger, Sellnow & Ulmer 2003: 231; Suchman 
1995). One of the main challenges to media managers’ sense making is then to be able 
to comprehend the event in accordance with the audience’s understanding of it. If the 
media managers are not successful in making this match, the organization risks losing 
its legitimacy. As losing or jeopardizing legitimacy is disastrous for organizations, crises 
make organizational history: organizational glory or embarrassment. 
The present article demonstrates how crisis events become important historical 
analogies for media managers with the potential to challenge previous assumptions and 
eventually give rise to new standards in news organizations’ program scheduling and 
organizational preparedness. Whereas previous research demonstrates the importance 
of history in terms of journalists’ typification of news events (that is, categorizing and 
finding the appropriate mode of reporting the news, for example in Tuchman 1973 and 
in Berkowitz 1992), the present article shows that historical analogies are used in dif-
ferent ways by the media managers who have to make the decisions on how to cover 
extraordinary events. There does not seem to be any resemblance regarding the type of 
news (for example, natural disasters, terror attacks, fires, etc.) Rather, the determining 
factors seemed to be whether an event came as a surprise, posed a challenge to organi-
zational values, and required quick decision-making. 
Notes
 1. The main part of the interviews studied here focus on the handling of the September 11th terrorist at-
tacks at Swedish Public Radio (SR), Swedish Public Television (SVT) and TV4. The semi-structured 
interviews, which were conducted within a year and a half after the crisis, have been part of a larger 
project on crisis management at SR, SVT and TV4 (altogether comprising: 44 interviews at SR, 31 
at SVT, and 6 at TV4). The interviews lasted for around one and a half hours and have all been tran-
scribed. The interviews selected for the present article consisted of the top managerial groups at each 
news organization – i.e. those responsible for the overarching program planning decisions on how to 
cover the event. The interviews focused on how the managers understood the situation at hand and 
how they dealt with it. The interviews used here include: six members of the managerial group at SVT 
(the Director of Planning, the Head of News, the Director of News and Current Affairs, the two Heads 
of the evening news programs Rapport and Aktuellt); five members of the TV4 managerial group (the 
Director of Programs, the Director of News, the Director of Planning, the Director of Current Affairs 
and the Director of Broadcasting); and three members of the SR managerial group (the Director of 
Programs ‘National,’ the Director of Programs ‘Local/National,’ and the Head of the news program 
Ekot). 
Additional interviews were conducted following the murder of Swedish Foreign Minister Anna 
Lindh in 2003, and in connection with those follow-up questions were posed regarding the impact 9/11 
had on organizational preparedness. The empirical material in the Anna Lindh case was more limited 
and consisted of five interviews with SVT managers (the Director of News and Current Affairs, the 
Head of News, the Director of Planning, the Head of the extra broadcasting organization, and one editor 
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from the extra broadcasting organization); one interview at TV4 with the Director of Current Affairs, 
and an interview with the Director of Programs National at SR. The study has been conducted using an 
abductive approach (i.e. an interactive theoretical and empirical process – see Alvesson and Sköldberg 
1994) based on close readings of the parts of the interviews in which the interviewees described big 
news events (in terms of their characteristics and their role for organizational learning) as well as on 
relevant literature in the field. 
 2. Tuchman (1973) argues that despite the fact that most news events can be placed in certain categories of 
news, some news events are so unique that they even become problematic for journalists to categorize. 
She refers to these events as “what-a-story” events, based on journalist’s reactions. Correspondingly, she 
describes journalists’ reactions to the announcement of US President Lyndon B. Johnson that he would 
not be running for re-election as the following: “Symbolically, the degree to which this typification is 
itself routine is captured by the almost stereotypical manner in which verbal and non-verbal gestures 
accompany the pronunciation of ‘what a story!’ ‘What’ is emphasized. The speaker provides additional 
emphasis by speaking more slowly than usual. The speaker adds yet more emphasis by nodding his [sic] 
head slowly, while smiling and rubbing his hands together” (p. 126). 
 3. It should be noted that for example Tuchman (1973) categorizes disaster news events as a form of routine 
news, so-called ‘developing news’ (p. 121).
 4. It should be noted that both SVT and TV4 broadcasted more news on this event than did SR (percentage 
of total broadcasting time: Aktuellt, 26; Rapport, 28; TV4, 25; SR, 19) (Ghersetti and Hvitfelt 2000: 51), 
which is one explanation as to why this event is not mentioned by interviewees at SR. 
 5. The shootings took place in central Stockholm on December 4, 1994, when a doorman and three guests 
were killed at the entrance to the popular nightclub ‘Sturecompagniet’. 
 6. TV4 began broadcasting by satellite and cable in 1990, and moved on to terrestrial broadcasting in 1992. 
The opening up of the public service media monopoly and the implications this had for the development 
of news practices in Sweden is an interesting area of study, but unfortunately beyond the scope of the 
present article. 
 7. Unlike SR and SVT, the managerial group at TV4 also made reference to the police murder in Malexander 
in 1999, not due to the magnitude of the event but rather as an event where the managerial group had 
been caught off guard and had to quickly readjust its planning. The event disrupted the normal schedul-
ing of TV4 and demanded swift action from the managerial group. TV4 had planned to broadcast its 
entertaining program ‘På rymmen’ (‘On the Run’), but the event made it both unethical to broadcast as 
well as practically impossible since it included helicopters taking off near the area of the crime scene 
which had been closed off. According to the Director of Programs, “All of the sudden an ordinary youth 
program had collided with reality, and that is not something you expect to happen […] and then we have 
to handle this in 15 minutes with people on their way to the studio, when there was no program…”.
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